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INSURANCE LAW
W. Shelby McKenzie*
In American InternationalInsurance Co. v. Roberts,1 the supreme
court spelled out the requirements for effective rejection of uninsured
motorist coverage or selection of limits lower than the coverage mandated by statute. Originally, Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)
required automobile liability policies to provide uninsured motorist
coverage within the minimum limits provided under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law.2 This act further provided that the insured could reject the coverage, but it did not describe the form or
procedure for such rejection. Act 154 of 1974 increased the mandated
coverage to the same limits as provided for in the policy for bodilyinjury liability, granting the insured the right to reject such coverage
or select lower limits. Again, no form or procedure was provided for
the rejection of coverage or the selection of lower limits.'
Act 494 of 1975 added the provision that such coverage was not
required in "a renewal or substitute policy, where the named insured
has rejected the coverage or selected lower limits in connection with
a policy previously issued to him by the insurer."' Finally, Act 438
of 1977, effective September 9, 1977, added the following: "Any document signed by the named insured or his legal representative which
initially rejects such coverage or selects lower limits shall be conclusively presumed to become a part of the policy or contract when
issued and delivered, irrespective of whether physically attached
thereto."5
In Roberts, the insured purchased, in January, 1975, automobile
liability insurance with bodily injury limits of $25,000 per person, but
he orally selected uninsured motorist (U.M.) limits of only $5,000 per
person. The policy was last renewed on June 6, 1978, prior to plaintiffs accident on July 13, 1978. Since the plaintiffs bodily-injury
Copyright 1982, by
*

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.

Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Louisiana Bar Association.
1. 404 So. 2d 948 (La. 1981).
2. 1962 La. Acts, No. 187. The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law is contained in LA. R.S. 32:8514043 (1950). It requires proof of ability to respond in damages
for liability in the amount of $5000 for bodily injury to one person, with a maximum
of $10,000 for bodily injury to two or more persons in one accident.
3. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1)(a).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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damages exceeded the purported U.M. limits of $5,000, the issue was
whether the oral selection of lower limits in January, 1975, was effective through the subsequent renewals of the policy.
Since the uninsured motorist statute did not specify the form for
rejection or selection of lower limits prior to Act 438 of 1977, the
supreme court held that the formality requirements had to be determined from general insurance law. The supreme court found that Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:628, which governs any agreement modifying a contract of insurance, requires that a rejection of coverage or
selection of lower limits be in writing and attached to the policy. The
court reasoned that Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D) mandated
certain coverage which was read into the policy by the terms of the
statute. Therefore, the rejection of coverage or selection of lower limits
was a modification of the policy which had to meet the formality requirements of Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:628. In Roberts, the oral
selection of lower limits in 1975 was ineffective, and the plaintiff was
entitled to the coverage mandated by the statute.
In summary, an effective rejection of coverage or selection of lower
limits prior to September 9, 1977 (the effective date of Act 438 of
1977) must be in writing and attached to the policy in accordance with
the requirements of Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:628. Subsequent
to September 9, 1977, Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(1)(a) requires a document signed by the named insured or his legal
representative for an effective rejection of coverage or selection of
lower limits; attachment to the policy, however, is not required.
In Niemann v. Travelers Insurance Co.,6 a sharply divided Louisiana Supreme Court cast a dark cloud of uncertainty over the existence of any subrogation claim for payments made under U.M.
coverage. In language indicating that the rights of the insurer under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1406(D)(4) were much more restrictive
than. subrogation rights, the court held that the U.M. carrier had no
right to enforce subrogation and consent-to-settle provisions which interfered with its insured's rights to settle with and release the
negligent motorist and his liability insurer.
In Bond v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.,' the weather improved for the insurer, and the skies are now only partly cloudy over its
subrogation claim. Suit was filed against the U.M. carrier, who in turn
filed a third party demand for indemnity against the allegedly
negligent underinsured motorist. Relying on Niemann, the court of
appeal dismissed the third party demand. On rehearing, the supreme
6. 368 So. 2d 1003 (La. 1979). See McKenzie, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Insurance, 40 LA. L. REV. 676, 678 (1980).
7. 407 So. 2d 401 (La. 1981).
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court reversed, holding that upon payment, an insurer, pursuant to
a subrogation agreement contained in its policy, becomes conventionally
subrogated to its insured's rights against the tort-feasor.8 The supreme
court indicated that the holding in Niemann should be limited to the
proposition "that an insurer may not enforce a clause excluding uninsured motorist coverage in the event of its insured's failure to obtain its consent before entering a reasonable settlement with an underinsured tortfeasor and his insurer."9 This conclusion was justified ,by
the court on the ground that such exclusion would conflict with the
aim of the U.M. statute to promote full recovery of all damages suffered by innocent motorists.
The net effect of Niemann and Bond is that an insurer may be
conventionally subrogated to its insured's rights against the negligent
motorist, but that subrogation right is subject to impairment by an
insured who enters into a "reasonable settlement" with the tort-feasor
and his liability insurer. Although the insurer is left with a shaky
subrogation right, the Niemann-Bond rule does strike a balance between the need for expeditious compensation of accident victims and
the desirability, where feasible, of making negligent motorists ultimately responsible for the damage they have caused (which encourages
the maintenance of adequate liability insurance).
In order for the Niemann-Bond rule to function in favor of the
accident victim, there must be certainty as to the effect of a settlement with and the release of the tort-feasor and his insurer. The insured who releases the negligent motorist as a condition of the settlement with that motorist's liability insurer must know that such release
will not affect his right to pursue an underinsured motorist claim
against his own insurer. Therefore, any settlement with the negligent
motorist and his liability insurer should be deemed reasonable if it
is understood that the U.M. carrier will be entitled to credit the full
liability policy limits against its own exposure."

8. The court indictated that this conventional subrogation right is generally
governed by Louisiana Civil Code articles 2159-2162.
9. 407 So. 2d at 411.
10. For example, if the negligent motorist has applicable liability coverage of
$10,000, then the uninsured motorist (U.M.) insurer should be entitled to credit $10,000
against the amount of its insured's bodily injury damages regardless of the actual
amount of the settlement with the liability carrier. There may be many factors (financial exigency, liability issues, coverage issues, etc.) which influence an insured to accept less than the full liability limits. Giving the insurer full credit would avoid any
uncertain, subjective test of reasonableness. Likewise, the financial ability of the
negligent motorist to respond in damages in excess of his liability policy limits should
not be considered. Again, such a factor would deter settlements because of its uncertain impact on the U.M. claim. Ordinarily, the liability carrier will not pay unless its
insured is also released. Of course, the U.M. insurer would be entitled to credit fully
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Bond and other recent supreme court decisions" emphasize that
the claim of the partially subrogated insurer is subordinate to the
insured's claim. The insured is entitled to recover the remainder of
his damages before the insurer is entitled to recover on its subrogation claim. Bond also concludes that the tort-feasor may assert inability
to pay in mitigation of a subrogation claim. On the other hand, the
court emphasized that the inability-to-pay doctrine cannot be utilized
by the insurer to reduce payments under U.M. coverage.
In Nall v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,12 the
supreme court further clarified the jurisprudence on the separate
significant issues involved in the recent Breaux" and Courville" cases.
The plaintiff in Nall, who was insured under two separate State Farm
policies, was injured while he was a guest passenger in an automobile
insured by GEICO. The negligence of the host driver was the sole
cause of the accident. The supreme court reaffirmed the holding in
Breaux" that the uninsured motorist statute"6 does not mandate U.M.
coverage under the host driver's policy when the sole cause of the
accident is the negligence of the host driver, even though the host
driver's liability coverage is inadequate. Thus, the plaintiff in Nall
was entitled to the limits of the GEICO liability coverage, but was
not entitled to any award under GEICO's U.M. coverage.' 7
The plaintiff in Nail also sought to recover under both State Farm
policies. The Courville case had indicated that the exception in the

any amount actually paid individually by the negligent motorist, and the law would
otherwise protect it against fraudulent conduct between the negligent motorist and
the U.M. insured. One exception to the "full credit" rule may be necessary. If there
are multiple claimants and inadequate policy limits, then the U.M. insurer should be
entitled to credit only for the actual amount of its insured's settlement with the liability
carrier, unless the U.M. carrier can prove lack of good faith. Cf. Holtzclaw v. Falco,
355 So. 2d 1279 (La. 1978); Richard v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 254 La. 429,
223 So. 2d 858 (1969).
11. Suhor v. Gusse, 414 So. 2d 1217 (La. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied; Southern
Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sonnier, 406 So. 2d 178 (La. 1981).
12. 406 So. 2d 216 (La. 1981).
13. Breaux v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 369 So. 2d 1335 (La. 1979). See
McKenzie, supra note 6, at 676.
14. Courville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 393 So. 2d 703 (La. 1981). See
McKenzie, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981-Insurance, 42 LA. L. REv. 343 (1982).
15. In Breaux, the issue had been raised under convoluted facts in which the plaintiffs had released all their rights under the policy on the host vehicle. As such, the
plaintiffs sought recovery from their own U.M. insurer. If U.M. coverage on the host
vehicle policy was mandated under LA. R.S. 22:1406(D), then the Breaux plaintiffs' own
insurer would have been entitled to credit for the released insurer's limits.
16. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D).
17. Two justices dissented, suggesting that Breaux should be overruled. 406 So.
2d at 220 (Dixon, J., dissenting).
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anti-stacking provision 8 in favor of a non-occupant would not be narrowly construed. However, in refusing to bend the provision in favor
of the plaintiff in Nail, the supreme court noted that three conditions
must be present to take advantage of the anti-stacking exception: (1)
the injured party must have been occupying an automobile not owned
by him; (2) there must be U.M. coverage on the occupied vehicle, which
coverage is primary; and (3) there must be at least one other U.M.
coverage available to the injured party who has not been fully compensated for his damages.'" Since the second condition was not
present-there Was no U.M. coverage available on the host vehiclethe Nall plaintiff was limited by the general rule to recovery under
one State Farm policy. The court held that State Farm had not waived
the benefit of the anti-stacking provision by issuing separate policies
on the plaintiffs two vehicles or by attaching an endorsement to each
policy which expanded the policy language to include the underinsured
motorist protection mandated by statute. °
In Breaux and Nall, the accident was caused solely by the
negligence of the host driver. In a footnote in Breaux,2' the supreme
court suggested that a guest passenger might be able to recover under
both the liability and U.M. coverages on the host vehicle if the host
driver were jointly liable with another driver who was underinsured.
This issue was presented in Casson v. Dairyland Insurance Co.2 A

18.

LA. R.S. 22:1406(DX1)(c):
If the insured has any limits of uninsured motorist coverage in a policy of
automobile liability insurance in accordance with the terms of Subsection D(1),
then such limits of liability shall not be increased because of multiple motor vehicles
covered under said policy of insurance and such limits of uninsured motorist
coverage shall not be increased when the insured has insurance available to him
under more than one uninsured motorist coverage provision or policy; provided,
however, that with respect to other insurance available, the policy of insurance
or endorsement shall provide the following:
With respect to bodily injury to an injured party while occupying an automobile
not owned by said injured party, the following priorities of recovery under uninsured motorist coverage shall apply:
(i) The uninsured motorist coverage on the vehicle in which the injured party
was an occupant is primary;
(ii) Should that primary uninsured motorist coverage be exhausted due to the
extent of damages, then the injured occupant may recover as excess from other
uninsured motorist coverage available to him. In no instance shall more than one
coverage from more than one uninsured motorist policy be available as excess
over and above the primary coverage available to the injured occupant.
19. 406 So. 2d at 218.
20. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(2)(c). Two justices dissented on the ground that the endorsement "probably operates as a waiver on the 'anti-stacking' amendment since it appears in both policies." 406 So. 2d at 220.
21. 369 So. 2d at 1338 n.5.
22. 400 So. 2d 713 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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serious accident was caused by the joint negligence of two drivers,
each auto being insured with liability and U.M. limits of $5,000 per
person and $10,000 per accident. At issue was the coverage available
to a guest passenger in one vehicle and three guest passengers in
the other vehicle, all with substantial claims.
With respect to the policies on the host vehicles, the court concluded that guest passengers could recover under the liability coverage
based upon the negligence of the host driver and under the U.M.
coverage based upon the negligence and inadequate coverage of the
other driver." Since both drivers were liable in solido to all four
claimants, the combined liability limit of $20,000 was apportioned
among them. The single guest passenger in one auto was entitled to
the $5,000 U.M. limit on that vehicle, and the other three shared the
$10,000 U.M. limit on the vehicle which they were occupying.
In Nash v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 4 the supreme court
considered whether an alleged insurer was entitled to relitigate the
issue of liability that had been determined in a previous action between the plaintiffs and the alleged insured. Initially, the plaintiffs
brought suit against their contractor, contending that the fire which
destroyed their house was caused by the contractor's improper installation of a gas heater. Western Casualty, the contractor's liability
insurer, was notified of the suit, but it declined to defend because
of its belief that the loss fell within the excluded completed-operations
hazard. A default judgment was taken against the contractor.
The plaintiffs then instituted suit against Western Casualty. Both
lower courts rejected the plaintiffs' demands on the ground that the
plaintiffs had failed to prove the contractor's liability. However, the
supreme court held that Western Casualty, which had refused the
opportunity to defend the original action, was not entitled to relitigate
the issue of liability. Therefore, Western Casualty could escape liability
in the second suit only if there was no coverage under its policy. The
court ruled in favor of the insurer on the ground that the fire loss,

23. Breaux held that LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) "contemplates two distinct motor vehicles:
the motor vehicle with respect to which uninsured motorist coverage is issued and
the 'uninsured or underinsured' motor vehicle." 369 So. 2d at 1338. Accord Nail, 406
So. 2d at 220. Unlike the facts in Breaux and Nall, two distinct motor vehicles existed in Casson. In an attempt to prevent recovery under both liability and uninsured
motorist coverage, some policies provide that payment under one coverage shall be
credited against the limits of liability under the other coverage. Although such a credit
provision was not discussed in Casson, the courts have generally found other reductionof-coverage provisions to be contrary to the mandated U.M. coverage. See, e.g., Smith
v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 270 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); Williams v. Buckelew,
246 So. 2d 58 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971). Cf. Hebert v. Green, 311 So. 2d 223 (La. 1975).
24. 406 So. 2d 176 (La. 1981).
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which occurred three weeks after the execution of a completion certificate, fell within the excluded completed-operations hazard.
If the rule is clearly defined and limited, the court's holding with
respect to relitigation of the liability issue appears correct.' It should
be noted that the plaintiffs in the original suit did not exercise their
right of direct action under Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:655.
Therefore, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the liberal protection
of that statute. 26 In the second suit, the plaintiffs were asserting the
insured's rights against his own insurer, and such claim should have
been subject to all of the defenses which the insurer could have
asserted against its own insured. Particularly, the subsequent claim
against the insurer should have been subject to any defenses based
upon policy breaches resulting from the failure to give timely notice
of claim or suit.Y In this case, Western Casualty apparently received
timely notice and had the opportunity to defend the original action.
Nash should not be read as an invitation to litigate liability without
the knowledge of the insurer. A default judgment taken without an
insurer's knowledge cannot be enforced against it.' Nash should stand
only for the proposition that the insurer who rejects the opportunity
to defend after proper notice thereafter should not be entitled to
relitigate the issue of liability with its alleged insured or his judgment creditors.
See 14 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW $ 51:73 (2d ed. 1982).
26. See, e.g., Futch v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 246 La. 688, 166 So. 2d 274
(1964); West v. Monroe Bakery, 217 La. 189, 46 So. 2d 122 (1950).
25.

27.

See, e.g., Branzaru v. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 769 (La. App. 1st Cir.

1971); Miller v. Marcantel, 221 So. 2d 557 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
28. Hallman v. Marquette Cas. Co., 149 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).

